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Economic Transformation and Development in Palestine
Justin Lonergan, Roger Williams University
Since the creation of Israel and the conflict that followed, the Palestinian economy has largely
been dependant on Israel as its premier economic trading partner and important source of daylabor. This source of employment has been the life-force of the Palestinian economy, with the
number of day-worker Palestinians in Israel in the year 2000 numbering approximately 128,000
Palestinians. In contrast, after the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the number was cut by threequarters, to only 32,000 work permits. Without this key element of the Palestinian economy, the
effect of this decrease has been a collapse of the Palestinian economy, increased unemployment,
and a generally deteriorating quality-of-life for most Palestinians. To put the crisis in
perspective, “the fiscal collapse of the PA [in mid-2001] was prevented by average monthly
infusions of $40 million from the donor community, amounting through 2002 to approximately
half of the PA’s monthly budget,1” as government funds dried up due to widespread
unemployment.

The urgency for action in the current situation is clear. According to the Palestinian Economic
Council for Development and Reconstruction, Palestinian losses due to Israeli border restrictions
totaled approximately 8.2 Billion U.S. dollars2, prior to the Yassin assassination. Should
checkpoint security increase and the West Bank and Gaza remain isolated, that number stands to
increase. The prospects for a Palestinian economy remaining dependent on Israel do not appear
good. As such, the Palestinian economy needs to adjust and become more independent of its
terrorized neighbor.

To this end, serious foreign investment is desperately needed in Palestine, in particular,
investment focused on infrastructure development. Investment in infrastructure for safe-passage
projects connecting the West Bank and Gaza are one example (see Connecting the West Bank and
Gaza Strip: Questions of “Safe-Passage”). Additionally, investing in projects that develop
infrastructure for the Palestinians to develop independent ties to foreign markets should also be a
focus of investment; specifically, projects facilitating air and sea transportation and trade should
receive significant investment.
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Repairing and restarting the Gaza International Airport would be a positive start. Unfortunately,
Israeli bombing of the runways following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada will require
serious investment. Similarly, a Gaza Seaport constructed over time could do much to alleviate
the current economic and humanitarian crises, especially if the West Bank and Gaza Strip become
effectively connected. Again, however, security concerns of both the Palestinians and Israelis
need to be assuaged.

Such security concerns have the unfortunate tendency to obscure the fact that the Palestinian
economy is ripe for investment. In particular, Palestine has a foundation of potentially welleducated, highly-intelligent workers, as well as a good basis for infrastructure improvement and
development.

Future investment comes primarily from several potential sources. The first is the U.S. Middle
East Partnership Initiative3, the second source being assistance from the Arab League, and the
final plan is the European Union’s existing MEDA Programme, which currently “offers technical
and financial support measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the
Mediterranean partners4,” including the Palestinian Authority. In terms of feasibility, the U.S.
plan, although comprehensive, does not appear politically realistic given the current domestic
situation of physical separation of the Security Fence along with the increasingly anti-American
position of the new Hamas leader, al-Rantissi. Arab League aid has drastically dropped from
over 40% of Palestinian economic aid disbursements in 2001 to 31% in 2003, while the same type
of disbursements from the EU have risen from 26% to 36% in the same time frame5. This is
because the EU offers a plan that is both comprehensive and much more politically and
financially realistic than the U.S. or Arab League plans. Moreover, the EU program has already
demonstrated reasonable and promising successes. First, the EU contributes approximately €10
million to projects that help to maintain the functionality of the Palestinian Authority as the
legitimate government of Palestine, with an additional €20 million budgeted by the EU to the
World Bank for use in Palestinian economic reform, development and reconstruction. All of
these programs demonstrate promise for the future of the Palestinian economy. Increasingly as
well, the EU has addressed the Palestinian plight by initiating programs that are geared towards
immediate economic concerns as they arise in Palestine; for example, “assistance from the
European Community budget for supporting the reform process and providing humanitarian aid
to the Palestinians stands at €570 million for 2002-20036.” From this particular plan (the MEDA
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plan), therefore, the EU has thus developed a certain rapport with the PA in terms of reform and
planning that are necessary for future economic development.

Of course, simply adding additional money into the Palestinian economy will not ensure
economic transformation. As mentioned, a significant portion of investment funds currently
being allocated are focused on sustaining minimal levels of stability in Palestine, such as essential
services for functional government. History demonstrates that “in comparison to other
developing countries, historically unprecedented amounts of foreign aid have been spent on
recurrent expenditures to cover burgeoning PA deficits7.” However, to be successful in
transformation, much more money must be specifically invested to create the institutions and
infrastructure that will allow for Palestinian economic growth. Unfortunately, this will most
likely require diversion of monies that go to maintaining quality-of-life programs. Only if further
increased funding that goes above post-Oslo II levels is invested through the EU MEDA
Programme will both sustenance and developmental programs be able to concurrently be
executed. To this end, the EU Programme is highly focused on creating a climate for investment:
“EuropeAid regularly publishes information on tender forecasts, notices and awards for service,
supply and works contracts as well as calls for proposals for projects to be subsidized8.” What
this means is that private direct investment, with adequate guarantees of proper dispersal, may
be the final source of monies that is required in order for real progress on infrastructure
development to be made.

While transition will be difficult, the evident failure of an economy of integration “necessitates
independence from Israeli control and the end of the unequal partnership, despite the large
associated costs9.” Despite the complicated and frustrating nature of the situation, international
and private “donors should not abandon their medium-term development programs, and should
continue to do what they can do to create the institutions and infrastructure of a future state10.”
At a minimum, such investment is more needed today, with the situation as bleak as it appears,
than was needed in the now-“happy days” that followed the Oslo Accords in the 1990s.
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